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Abstract
Rebate programs are often used in the residential water sector to alleviate market
failures that may hamper the adoption of water-efficient technologies. In this paper, we
examine whether several rebate programs stimulate or crowd out private investment in
indoor and outdoor technologies. To do so, we use a panel of household-level data from
a water district in Southern California for the period 2014-2015. Our results indicate
that, while all the rebate programs considered in the analysis increase private invest-
ment in water-efficient technologies, only outdoor rebate programs generate further
private investment in other outdoor technologies.
JEL-Classification: Q20; Q25; Q28.
Keywords: Residential Water Demand; Rebate Programs; Additionality; Average Treat-
ment Effect
1 Introduction
As more frequent and severe droughts are expected to affect many parts of the world, in-
creasing efforts are being made to ensure water availability. Innovation in water-efficient
technologies (such as low-flow toilets, high-efficiency washing machines and weather-based
irrigation controllers) has rapidly increased in recent years, as can be inferred from the
rise in the number of patents in this sector. The number of patents granted worldwide for
demand-side (i.e. water conservation) technologies has increased by 150.3% from 2005 to
2014, whereas the total number of patents worldwide increased by only 102.14% during the
same period(OECD, 2017).
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However, the increase in the number of patents alone is not sufficient to generate water
savings from a new technology. As noted by Jaffe and Stavins (1995), water savings result
from a three step process. First, a new technical idea needs to be developed (invention);
then, this idea needs to be transformed into a product (innovation); last, the product must
become widely adopted (diffusion). Similar to the case of environmental pollution studied
by Jaffe et al. (2005), there exist market failures associated with water use that interact with
market failures related to technological innovation and diffusion that may hamper the adop-
tion of new technologies. Regarding the former, consider that most water is not supplied by
a competitive market, thus consumers do not face the full opportunity cost of their water
use. Instead, they typically face the out-of-pocket cost of delivering water. This means water
is under-priced, water-efficient technologies are uneconomical compared to their less-efficient
alternatives, and thus consumption is inefficiently high. Practical impacts of this include
over-extraction of ground and surface water supplies and associated environmental degrada-
tion. Regarding the latter type of market failure, consider that innovation and diffusion of
new technologies are characterized by uncertainty Jaffe et al. (2005). Greater uncertainty
about new technologies compared to their more established alternatives creates a disincen-
tive for adoption, even if consumers would be better-off selecting the new technology. In this
context, public policies such as rebate programs (i.e. technology subsidies for consumers)
are commonly used to foster the adoption of new water-efficient technologies.
One of the main concerns regarding the use of rebates to promote technology adoption
is whether such incentives lead to additional technological adoption that would not have
been achieved in the absence of the rebate program. This is known in the literature as the
“additionality” question. As Joskow and Marron (1992) argue for the case of electricity con-
servation programs, many participants in rebate programs may be non-additional, instead
obtaining a rebate (subsidy) merely to substitute public funding for private investment in the
subsidized technology. As a consequence, several studies in the energy and water economics
literatures examine whether rebate programs effectively promote greater adoption of the sub-
sidized technology. Among these, Boomhower and Davis (2014) use a regression discontinuity
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analysis to examine additionality of energy-efficiency subsidies, focusing on air conditioners
and refrigerators. Bennear et al. (2013) estimate a difference-in-difference model to measure
the reduction in water use generated by a rebate program for the adoption of high-efficiency
toilets. And Brent et al. (2015) analyze data from three randomized field experiments to
understand whether social comparisons act as a water conservation tool, in particular when
interacted with rebate programs. While most papers measuring additionality analyze the
effect of rebate programs in terms of reductions in energy and water consumption, as far
as we are aware, no study considers whether participation in rebate programs may affect
private investments in other efficient technologies.
In this paper, we take a different approach to analyze the effectiveness of rebate pro-
grams by adapting a common method in the R&D literature. In particular, we compare
the level of investment in water-efficient technologies between rebate program participants
and non-participants, but we do not limit our focus to the subsidized technology. Rather,
we consider the extent to which a rebate for a water efficient technology creates additional
private investment in water efficiency more generally. This approach allows us to tackle two
research questions. The first is similar to the additionality question but broader: does a tech-
nology rebate lead to private investments in water-efficient technologies beyond what would
have been achieved in the absence of the rebate program? That is, we test for a “crowding-
out” effect. The second question is: does a technology rebate lead to private investment in
unsubsidized water-efficient technologies specifically? We refer to this as an “acceleration
effect”. One of the main advantages of our approach compared to previous papers in the
water economics literature is that it allows us to disentangle this indirect investment effect.
To examine these two questions, we use data from the Moulton Niguel Water District in
Southern California. These data are particularly useful because multiple rebate programs for
the adoption of both indoor and outdoor water-efficient technologies were offered in recent
years to strengthen local drought resilience. However, one of the challenges in using this data
is that we observe the year but not the month of adoption for the unsubsidized water-efficient
technologies. As a consequence, it is not possible to directly measure rebate-induced water
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savings. Instead, we focus on measuring investment in water-efficient technologies, and use
these results combined with water saving estimates from the literature to construct policy
implications.
Our results indicate that each of the four rebates considered in the analysis achieve
investment in water-efficient technologies that would not have occurred in the absence of
the rebate. Moreover, we find that rebates for outdoor water-efficient technologies also
achieve additional private investment in other unsubsidized technologies, but rebates for
indoor technologies do not. Considering that outdoor technologies also have larger water
conservation potential and are generally in earlier adoption stages, policymakers should
focus on these technologies to foster water conservation.
2 Motivation for water conservation rebate programs
Water conservation technologies may generate positive externalities (such as enhanced avail-
ability of water for environmental or emergency uses, or improved information about the
effectiveness of new technologies) that typically are not internalized by the technology
adopters. Therefore, the level of privately financed household water conservation may be
lower than socially desired, which provides economic motivation for policies that promote
greater private investment. In order to encourage greater investment in water conservation
technologies, water districts often use rebate programs that reduce the price of these tech-
nologies and thus increase demand. However, households may apply for rebate programs
merely to finance investment in water conservation technologies that they would adopt any-
way in the absence of the incentive. That is, households may substitute public for private
investment. On the basis of this reasoning we can hypothesize the following:
Hypothesis 1 (There exists total crowding-out.): There exists total crowding-out if
we observe a complete substitution of public for private investment.
Under total crowding-out, the level of investment in water-efficient technologies is not
significantly larger for households participating in the rebate program. One cause of total
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crowding-out would be if the average household decides to invest in a certain level of water-
efficient technologies separately from the decision participate in the rebate program.
Hypothesis 2 (There exists partial crowding-out.): Similarly, there exists partial crowding-
out when we observe a partial substitution of public for private investment.
This hypothesis implies that the level of investment in water-efficient technologies among
households participating in the rebate program is significantly higher than it would be in
the absence of the rebate, but lower than the level of subsidies granted. That is, while there
is additional investment in water-efficient technologies, it is less than the amount of rebates
offered. In this case, the level of investment in water-efficient technologies excluding the
subsidized technology is smaller than the level of investment in water-efficient technologies
in the absence of the rebate.
Hypothesis 3 (There is no acceleration effect.): There is no acceleration when partic-
ipant households do not adopt other unsubsidized water-efficient technologies jointly with the
subsidized technology.
Under this hypothesis, the rebate program may achieve additional adoption of the sub-
sidized technology, but no further adoption of other water-efficient technologies will be
achieved.
3 Method
The hypotheses defined above are tested separately for each of the rebates considered. In
order to test these hypotheses, and following Czarnitzki and Hussinger (2004) and Fre-
itas et al. (2017), we first define two measures of investment in technologies for each re-
bate: the level of investment in water-efficient technologies adopted during the period of
observation including the subsidized technology (Tot WT ), and the level of investment in
water-efficient technologies adopted during the observation period excluding the subsidized
technology (NoSub WT ). To estimate the effect of the rebate programs on these measures,
we conduct a treatment analysis that allows us to understand the extent households have
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adopted water conservation technologies, on average, due to receiving a rebate. We focus
explicitly on rebate program participants and we estimate the average treatment effect on
the treated (ATET). As noted by Caliendo and Kopeinig (2008), ATET is defined as the
difference between the expected outcome (investment in water-efficient technologies) with
and without treatment (a rebate) for those participating in the treatment (rebate program
participants). Using the measure Tot WT , ATET is defined as:
τATET = E(Tot WT1i|R = 1)− E(Tot WT0i|R = 1) (1)
where τATET is the average treatment effect on the treated, and Tot WT1i and Tot WT0i
indicate the total levels of investment in water conservation technologies in the case of
treatment and the counter factual situation of no treatment, respectively. R indicates the
treatment status with R = 1 indicating that the household receives a rebate.
Similarly, we use the measure NoSub WT to estimate another average treatment effect
on the treated αATET defined as:
αATET = E(NoSub WT1i|R = 1)− E(NoSub WT0i|R = 1) (2)
where NoSub WT1i and NoSub WT0i represent analogous levels of investment for the
situations of treatment and no treatment, respectively.
Of course, Tot WT0i and NoSub WT0i are not observed for rebate program partici-
pants, as they describe the hypothetical outcomes associated with not receiving a rebate
for those households who participated in the rebate program. To address this challenge, we
could use non-participants as control group if E(Tot WT0i|R = 1) = E(Tot WT0i|R = 0)
and E(NoSub WT0i|R = 1) = E(NoSub WT0i|R = 0). However, because rebate par-
ticipants were not randomly assigned, these conditions likely do not hold, and thus using
non-participants as a control group would yield biased results. In order to control for this
problem, we follow the approach by Czarnitzki and Hussinger (2004) and Freitas et al.
(2017), and implement a matching technique to estimate the average treatment effect on the
treated. Matching involves pairing households participating in a rebate program with non-
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participating comparison households that are similar in terms of observable characteristics.
As discussed by Dehejia and Wahba (2002), matching is straightforward if we only observe a
small number of characteristics. However, when participant and non-participant households
may differ across a large number of variables, matching becomes more difficult.
In this context, propensity score matching can provide a weighting scheme to estimate
an unbiased treatment effect. The propensity score, i.e., the probability of receiving a rebate
p(x) conditional on some pre-treatment characteristics x is defined as (Becker and Ichino,
2002):
p(x) ≡ Pr(R = 1|x) (3)
As noted by Dehejia and Wahba (2002), any standard probability model, such as probit,
can be used because the objective of the propensity score is to reduce the dimensional-
ity of the observable characteristics, and there are no behavioral assumptions attached to
the model. Moreover, Caliendo and Kopeinig (2008) indicate that the choice between logit
and probit is not critical, as these models yield similar results. In this paper, the propen-
sity score is estimated using a probit model. Regarding the matching algorithm, we use
the nearest-neighbor matching, as it is the most straightforward algorithm (Caliendo and
Kopeinig, 2008). This involves matching a household participating in a rebate program with
a non-participant household that is closest in terms of its propensity score. When using the
nearest-neighbor matching, one has to decide how many non-participant households should
be chosen for each household participating in a rebate program. In this paper, we follow
the recommendation of Austin (2010) and we select one non-participant household for each
participant, as this choice tends to minimize bias.1
After matching households based on their propensity score, the second step implies com-
puting the ATET as in Equations (1) and (2):
τATET = E(Tot WT1i|R = 1, p(x))− E(Tot WT0i|R = 0, p(x)) (4)
1The reader is referred to (Becker and Ichino, 2002) for more details about the matching algorithm.
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αATET = E(NoSub WT1i|R = 1, p(x))− E(NoSub WT0i|R = 0, p(x)) (5)
And Equation (4) and (5) can be estimated as follows:
τATET =
1
NT
∑
iT
Tot WT Ti − ∑
jC(i)
wijTot WT
C
j
 (6)
αATET =
1
NT
∑
iT
NoSub WT Ti − ∑
jC(i)
wijNoSub WT
C
j
 (7)
where NT is the number of households participating in a rebate program, C(i) is the set
of non-participating households matched to participant household i and wij is the weight of
non-participant household j (with
∑
jC(i)wij = 1).
Once we obtain τATET and αATET , we can test the hypotheses discussed in Section 2. We
can reject the null hypothesis of total crowding-out if we find evidence that τATET > 0, i.e.,
the total level of investment in water-efficient technologies is significantly larger for rebate
participants. Moreover, αATET allows us to simultaneously test Hypothesis 2 and Hypothesis
3. First, if αATET ≥ 0, the level of investment in unsubsidized devices among rebate program
participants is not less than the level of investment among non-participants, indicating that
there is no partial substitution of public for private investment. Therefore, we can reject the
null hypothesis of partial crowding-out. Second, if αATET > 0, rebate participants show a
larger level of investment in unsubsidized technologies than the level of investment among
non-participants. In this case, we can reject the null hypothesis of no acceleration effect.
To further explore the nature of additionality effects, we also disaggregate our data into
technologies that are used indoors vs. those that are used outdoors, and consider each
subset separately. That is, we conduct the same tests using the investments in indoor
and outdoor water-efficient technologies (Indoor WT and Outdoor WT , respectively), and
the investments in indoor and outdoor water-efficient technologies excluding the subsidized
technology (IndoorNoSub WT and OutdoorNoSub WT ).
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4 Data
We use a database of single-family residential households in Southern California served by
the Moulton Niguel Water District (MNWD). This water district provides water, recycled
water and waste-water treatment services to the Orange County cities of Aliso Viejo, La-
guna Niguel, Laguna Hills, Mission Viejo, Dana Point and San Juan Capistrano. MNWD is
a member agency of Metropolitan Water District of Southern California (MWD), a regional
water wholesaler. As such, all households served by MNWD can benefit from the rebate
programs offered by MWD. MNWD provided customer records for participation in rebate
programs for the adoption of several indoor and outdoor technologies, household water con-
sumption, water prices and household characteristics such as the number of residents and the
size of the irrigated area. This information was then merged with data from an online survey
about household adoption of a larger set of water-efficient technologies. MNWD customers
received an e-mail informing them of the survey and inviting them to participate through
the water agency’s website. The survey was conducted during fall 2016 and consumers
were asked what sort of conservation programs (water-efficient technologies and habits) they
adopted (i) within the last year, (ii) between one and two years ago, and (iii) more than two
years ago. The total number of respondents who completed the survey was around 4,000,
yielding a response rate of around 8.5%.2 After removing respondent households that did
not have complete customer records during the entire reference period in the survey, the
resulting database is a panel of 3,343 households for the period fall 2014- fall 2016.
For the first step of the analysis, that is, the estimation of the probability that a household
receives a rebate for the adoption of water-efficient technologies, we consider the following
four binary indicators as dependent variables:
• Rebate washers : a dummy variable that takes value 1 if a household receives a rebate
2Selection bias may occur if households equipped with water-efficient technologies are also more likely to
respond to the survey. In order to investigate this potential sample selection issue, we computed adoption
rates for survey respondents that participated in the rebate programs and compared them with the adoption
rates reported by MNWD. Both rates are relatively close and therefore, we can assume that there is not
likely a selection issue.
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for the adoption of a high-efficiency clothes washer, 0 otherwise.
• Rebate toilets : a dummy variable that takes a value 1 if a household receives a rebate
for the adoption of a high-efficiency toilet.
• Rebate landscape: a dummy variable that takes value 1 if a household participates in
the landscape transformation program. This program helps households save water by
removing turf and converting to a drought tolerant landscape.
• Rebate weather controller : a dummy that takes value 1 if a household receives a rebate
for investing in a weather-based irrigation controllers. These controllers automatically
adjust the irrigation schedule to account for changing weather.
As explanatory variables for these four regressions, we include a set of socioeconomic and
demographic characteristics, indicators of each household’s water conservation orientation,
variables to account for each household’s awareness and previous experience with rebate
programs, and each household’s self-reported relative importance of factors affecting the de-
cision to adopt water conservation technologies. In terms of socioeconomic and demographic
characteristics, we include variables such as the number of residents (HHS ), the number of
children under 6 years old (Members<6 ), the number of children between 6 and 17 years old
(Members6-17 ), median income in the relevant census block group (Income), the proportion
of people within the same census block group who have a bachelors degree (bachelors), and
the median age of residents in the relevant census block group (Age). Moreover, for the two
regressions regarding the rebates for outdoor technologies, we also include the amount of
irrigated landscape (Irrigated area) and a binary indicator that accounts for households in
which a gardener controls the irrigation schedule (Gardener). Last, we include for the re-
gression regarding the landscape transformation program a dummy variable that takes value
1 if the household belongs to a Home Owners Association (HOA), and 0 otherwise. The
reason to include this explanatory variable in this regression is that some HOAs have strict
regulations about landscapes which may create difficulties or disincentives for participating
in the rebate programs. The inclusion of this set of variables is consistent with Alberini
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et al. (2013), who estimate a probit model to analyze the determinants of receiving rebates
or tax credits for the adoption of energy-saving technologies and consider both house and
household characteristics as explanatory variables.
Regarding each household’s water conservation orientation, we include two categorical
indicators of the numbers of water-efficient indoor and outdoor technologies in the pre-
vious year (Indoor technology(t-1) and Outdoor technology(t-1)). Similarly, Allcott et al.
(2015) also consider whether households are already equipped with conservation technolo-
gies when analyzing the characteristics of energy efficiency subsidy adopters. Moreover,
following Beaumais et al. (2010) and Pe´rez-Urdiales and Garc´ıa-Valin˜as (2016), we include
a water conservation habits index constructed by calculating the mean score on the survey
questions related to the values of water use/conservation habits (possible answers were 1 =
yes or 0 = no). We consider only well-established habits that have been performed for at
least one year.
In order to account for household awareness and previous experience with rebate pro-
grams, we include dummy variables (Rebate other washers(t-1), Rebate other toilets(t-1),
Rebate other landscape(t-1) and Rebate other weather controller(t-1)) that take value 1 if a
household has received a rebate in the previous period and 0 otherwise. We also include bi-
nary indicators that account for whether the head of the household is aware of the existence
of the rebate program3 (Rebate aware washers, Rebate aware toilets, Rebate aware landscape
and Rebate aware controller).
Last, we follow Tonn and Berry (1986) and include a set of variables indicating the extent
to which respondents self-report that certain incentives are relevant in the decision to adopt
water-efficient technologies. In particular, we consider categorical indicators (0-4 scale) for
money savings in the water bill (Money savings), water savings (Water savings), and initial
time investment (Time investment), duration of the technology adoption project Duration
project and feedback from friends and neighbors about the technology Feedback friends.
3For instance, households may receive a rebate without being aware of its existence if they are auto-
matically presented with the discounted price at the store or if their landscapers are making the purchase
decision.
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Descriptive statistics for the variables included in the propensity score matching step are
provided in Table 1.
Table 1: Summary statistics – Propensity Score Matching
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Source
Rebate washers 0.024 0.154 0 1 MNWD records
Rebate toilets 0.036 0.186 0 1 MNWD records
Rebate landscape 0.032 0.175 0 1 MNWD records
Rebate weather controller 0.007 0.086 0 1 MNWD records
Habits 0.527 0.242 0 1 Survey
Rebate other washers(t-1) 0.070 0.255 0 1 MNWD records
Rebate other toilets(t-1) 0.051 0.219 0 1 MNWD records
Rebate other landscape(t-1) 0.072 0.258 0 1 MNWD records
Rebate other weather controller(t-1) 0.087 0.282 0 1 MNWD records
Rebate aware washers 0.515 0.500 0 1 Survey
Rebate aware toilets 0.585 0.493 0 1 Survey
Rebate aware landscape 0.657 0.475 0. 1 Survey
Rebate aware controllers 0.342 0.474 0 1 Survey
HHS 3.939 0.687 3 10 MNWD records
Bachelors 0.489 0.109 0.192 0.723 Census
Income ($1,000) 112.792 33.512 37.161 198.708 Census
Age 43.336 7.166 28.800 62.700 Census
Time investment 2.238 1.229 0 4 Survey
Monetary savings 2.696 1.133 0 4 Survey
Water savings 2.841 1.075 0 4 Survey
Duration project 2.071 1.210 0 4 Survey
Feedback friends 1.736 1.271 0 4 Survey
Members<6 0.170 0.518 0 5 Survey
Continued on next page
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Table 1 – continued from previous page
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Source
Members6-17 0.467 0.875 0 9 Survey
Gardener 0.510 0.500 0 1 Survey
HOA 0.737 0.440 0 1 Survey
Irrigated area (1,000 sq ft) 2.811 3.390 0 50.163 MNWD records
Indoor technology(t-1) 2.151 1.149 0 4 Survey
Outdoor technology(t-1) 0.980 1.007 0 4 Survey
For the second step, calculating ATET, we must compare the level of investment in
water-efficient technologies between rebate program participants and non-participants. The
usual approach in the R&D literature (Czarnitzki and Hussinger, 2004; Freitas et al., 2017)
is to use expenditures on new technologies as the variable of interest. However, we do not
observe actual expenditures in our data. Instead, we observe only adoption decisions and
rebate program participation. Therefore our investment measure is an cardinal index that
accounts for the number of water-efficient technologies adopted in each period.4
To test for total crowding-out, we consider the total number of water-efficient appliances
(Tot WT ), the number of indoor water-efficient appliances (Indoor WT ), and the number
of outdoor water-efficient appliances (Outdoor WT ) adopted during the period of observa-
tion. To jointly test for partial crowding-out and no acceleration effect, we use NoSub WT ,
IndoorNoSub WT and OutdoorNoSub WT . As discussed in Section 3, the difference be-
tween these variables and those used to test for total crowding-out is that we exclude the
subsidized technology for the rebate program under consideration. For all of these tests,
indoor water-efficient technologies include efficient clothes washers, low flow toilets, efficient
dishwashers and low flow showers. Outdoor water-efficient technologies include weather-
based irrigation controllers, landscape transformation, drip irrigation and pool covers. As
can be seen in Table 3, there exist households in our sample that invest in the maximum
4While this variable is a proxy for the level of investment in water-efficient technologies, it does not allow
us to account for differences in technology quality that could be captured using a monetary indicator.
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Table 2: Summary statistics - ATET Estimation
Mean Std Dev Min Max N
Tot WT 0.646 1.009 0 7 6686
NoSub WT 0.546 0.936 0 7 6686
Indoor WT 0.300 0.623 0 4 6686
IndoorNoSub WT 0.240 0.573 0 4 6686
Outdoor WT 0.346 0.706 0 4 6686
OutdoorNoSub WT 0.306 0.657 0 4 6686
Table 3: Summary statistics - Treatment Households - ATET Estimation
Rebate washers Rebate toilets Rebate landscape Rebate weather controller
Mean N Mean N Mean N Mean N
Tot WT 1.877 162 1.759 241 1.953 211 2.240 50
NoSub WT 0.648 162 0.589 241 0.820 211 0.980 50
Indoor WT 1.358 162 1.311 241 0.332 211 0.400 50
IndoorNoSub WT 0.204 162 0.207 241 0.237 211 0.260 50
Outdoor WT 0.519 162 0.448 241 1.621 211 1.840 50
OutdoorNoSub WT 0.444 162 0.382 241 0.583 211 0.720 50
number of indoor or outdoor technologies during the period of analysis, but there is not a
household that invests in the maximum level of all technologies.
5 Results and policy implications
5.1 The probability of participating in a rebate program
As explained in Section 3, we start our analysis by estimating the probability of receiving a
rebate. In table 4 we report the probit estimation results for each of the rebate programs
considered. The estimations reported in Columns (1) and (2) are for indoor water-efficient
technologies, i.e., Rebate washers and Rebate toilets, whereas Columns (3) and (4) show
the results for the outdoor water-efficient technologies, that is, Rebate landscape and Rebate
weather controller.
In general, the estimated coefficients, when significant, are intuitive in the four models.
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Here, we review some of the most noteworthy results.5 Comparing the four estimations, we
observe, as could be expected, that awareness of each rebate is positive and significant at the
1% level in the four models. That is, this variable is one of the main determinants of rebate
participation across different programs. However, previous experience with rebate programs
does not have a significant effect in any of the estimations.
Regarding socioeconomic and demographic characteristics, HHS has a positive and sig-
nificant effect (at 5%) on participation in the rebate program for efficient washers and for
landscape transformation. That is, the more people living in the household, and presum-
ably more frequent laundry loads, the higher the probability of participating in the rebate
program. Income has a positive and significant effect (although only at 10%) on Rebate land-
scape, as landscape transformation projects can be expensive even with a rebate. Age also
has a positive effect on Rebate landscape at 1%, whereas the effect is negative and significant
on Rebate weather controller at 10%. This would be consistent with a desire to save water
but aversion to perceived “high-tech” solutions. Moreover, the coefficient of Members<6 is
positive and significant at 5% in the 4th estimation. This indicates that households with
a higher proportion of kids under 6 have a higher probability of receiving a rebate for the
adoption of weather-based irrigation controllers, which is a technology that allows them to
maintain but efficiently irrigate their lawn.
In terms of the effects of a household’s water conservation orientation, we find that
households that have previously adopted indoor water-efficient technologies are less likely
to participate in indoor rebate programs (the estimated coefficients are significant at the
1% level). For the case of previous outdoor technologies, this effect is also negative and
significant at 5% for Rebate toilets, but it is positive and significant at 1% for Rebate weather
controller. The negative effect could mean that these households do not need the support
of the rebate program to adopt more water-efficient technologies. Alternatively, households
that have already installed water-efficient technologies may be less likely to further invest in
new ones—perhaps feeling that they already have achieved adequate efficiency gains. Re-
5Given the large number of explanatory variables included in the first step, we have computed the variance
inflated factor (VIF) and tolerance value to test for multicollinearity, and we reject it in all cases.
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garding the positive effect, one possible explanation is that previous satisfactory experience
in conserving water may encourage households to participate in the rebate for weather-based
irrigation controllers. The coefficient for Habits is negative and significant for the outdoor
technology estimations, at the 5% and 1% levels for Rebate landscape and Rebate weather
controller, respectively. Similar to the negative effect of previous technologies on rebate
participation, households manifesting water conservation habits may be more likely to in-
vest in these technologies without receiving a rebate, but Habits may also be perceived as a
substitute for efficient technologies.
Time investment has a positive and significant effect at the 10% level on Rebate washers,
i.e., households that attach greater importance to the amount of time required to participate
in a rebate program are more likely to receive a rebate for efficient washers. Moreover,
Feedback friends has a positive and significant effect at 5% on Rebate landscape, indicating
that feedback from friends who have previously transformed their landscape increases the
probability of receiving this rebate.
Last, regarding the variables directly linked to the outdoor characteristics, we find that
Gardener has a negative and significant effect at 5% on Rebate landscape, whereas the size
of the irrigated area has a positive and significant effect at 5% on this probability. However,
neither of these characteristics has a significant effect on Rebate weather controller.
Table 4: Estimation results for the probability of receiving a rebate
Rebate washers Rebate toilets Rebate landscape Rebate weather controller
HHS 0.127** -0.0395 0.103** 0.121
(2.55) (-0.77) (2.04) (1.33)
Bachelors -0.411 0.200 -0.0290 1.052
(-0.98) (0.53) (-0.07) (1.33)
Income 0.00212 0.00178 0.00219* -0.000669
(1.56) (1.47) (1.66) (-0.27)
Age 0.00792 0.00344 0.0155*** -0.0164*
(1.53) (0.75) (3.05) (-1.74)
Members<6 -0.0328 -0.0353 -0.0809 0.176**
(-0.46) (-0.50) (-1.13) (2.09)
Members6-17 0.0455 0.00711 0.0104 0.0752
Continued on next page
16
Table 4 – continued from previous page
Rebate washers Rebate toilets Rebate landscape Rebate weather controller
(1.19) (0.18) (0.27) (1.18)
Indoor technology(t-1) -0.147*** -0.162*** 0.0276 0.0149
(-4.35) (-5.42) (0.87) (0.25)
Outdoor technology(t-1) 0.0136 -0.0887** -0.0216 0.252***
(0.36) (-2.50) (-0.65) (4.21)
Time investment 0.0563* -0.0174 -0.0272 0.0166
(1.81) (-0.63) (-0.83) (0.27)
Monetary savings 0.0198 -0.0538 0.0574 0.103
(0.36) (-1.18) (1.16) (1.07)
Water savings -0.0360 0.0229 0.0229 -0.147
(-0.63) (0.48) (0.44) (-1.47)
Duration project -0.0155 -0.0428
(-0.44) (-0.60)
Feedback friends 0.0744** 0.0460
(2.51) (0.78)
Habits -0.134 -0.0874 -0.343** -0.792***
(-0.87) (-0.63) (-2.36) (-2.92)
Rebate other washers(t-1) 0.153
(1.26)
Rebate other toilets(t-1) 0.0399
(0.29)
Rebate other landscape(t-1) 0.0257
(0.22)
Rebate other weather controller(t-1) -0.366
(-1.54)
Rebate aware washers 0.968***
(9.49)
Rebate aware toilets 1.535***
(9.44)
Rebate aware landscape 1.465***
(6.67)
Rebate aware weather controllers 1.561***
(5.16)
Gardener -0.144** 0.0367
(-2.14) (0.29)
HOA -0.102
(-1.26)
Irrigated area 0.0209** 0.00429
Continued on next page
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Table 4 – continued from previous page
Rebate washers Rebate toilets Rebate landscape Rebate weather controller
(2.39) (0.24)
Constant -3.324*** -2.799*** -4.535*** -3.783***
(-9.05) (-7.87) (-10.59) (-5.39)
N 6686 6686 6686 6686
t statistics in parentheses
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
5.2 Hypothesis testing
As explained in Section 3, we use the propensity scores obtained in the first stage as matching
arguments for the second stage. Table 5 reports the second stage estimated average treatment
effect on the treated for the variables of interest summarized in Table 3. These estimates rep-
resent the average additional numbers of total (Tot WT and NoSub WT ), indoor(Indoor WT
and IndoorNoSub WT ) and outdoor (Outdoor WT and OutdoorNoSub WT ) water-efficient
technologies adopted by households participating in rebate programs.
First, we consider Hypothesis 1, i.e. total crowding-out. Our results show that τATET in
Column (1) is positive and significant for each of the four rebates considered. This indicates
that all the rebate programs in the analysis generate higher investments in water-efficient
technologies, on average, so we can reject Hypothesis 1: total crowding-out. This result
remains true when we distinguish between indoor and outdoor water-efficient technologies, as
both average treatment effects on the treated for Indoor WT and Outdoor WT, in Columns
(3) and (5) respectively, are positive and significant for the four rebates.
However, when we test Hypothesis 2: partial crowding out, and Hypothesis 3: no ac-
celeration, we find mixed results. For indoor rebates, the average treatment effect on the
treated for NoSub WT, in Column (2), is negative but not statistically significant. Thus,
we reject Hypothesis 2 but we cannot reject Hypothesis 3, i.e., we do not find evidence
of partial crowding-out or acceleration. That is, the total number of water-efficient tech-
nologies adopted, excluding the technology that was subsidized, is neither higher nor lower
for participant households compared to non-participant households. In the case of rebates
18
Table 5: Average treatment effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Tot WT NoSub WT Indoor WT IndoorNoSub WT Outdoor WT OutdoorNoSub WT
τATET αATET τATET αATET τATET αATET
Rebate washers 1.068*** -0.105 0.914*** -0.216***
(8.97) (-0.96) (13.09) (-3.26)
Rebate toilets 0.971*** -0.129 0.921*** -0.154***
(9.06) (-1.30) (15.10) (-2.78)
Rebate landscape 1.194*** 0.171 1.232*** 0.194**
(10.31) (1.58) (15.81) (2.52)
Rebate weather 1.520*** 0.420** 1.480*** 0.420***
controller (9.70) (2.09) (12.07) (3.14)
t statistics in parentheses
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.010
for outdoor water-efficient technologies, αATET is positive, but significant only for Rebate
weather controller when using NoSub WT, in Column (2), as variable of interest, i.e., we
find evidence of acceleration.
When we look at the disaggregated indicators for testing partial crowding-out and no
acceleration effect we find a significant negative αATET when considering IndoorNoSub WT,
shown in Column (4). Thus, we cannot reject partial crowding-out or no acceleration for
households receiving rebates for indoor water-efficient technologies. This seems to indicate
that while, on average, households participating in rebate programs for the adoption of
indoor technologies also invest more in outdoor technologies than the control group, their
total level of water-efficient technologies adopted during the year excluding the subsidized
technology is not significantly higher. However, αATET is positive and significant for both
outdoor rebates when we use OutdoorNoSub WT, in Column (6), indicating that we reject
both Hypotheses 2 and 3. That is, households receiving a rebate for landscape transformation
or for the investment in weather-based irrigation controllers are more likely to invest in other
outdoor water-efficient technologies. These rebates are not only promoting investment in the
subsidized technology, but also in other outdoor technologies.
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5.3 Policy implications
Our results indicate that rebate programs may have different effects on the level of invest-
ment in water-efficient technologies depending on the type of subsidized technology consid-
ered. One possible explanation for the differences in rebate effects for indoor and outdoor
technologies may be that the subsidized technologies are at different stages of the adoption
process. Table 6 shows the percentage of households in our sample that have adopted each
technology just prior to our period of analysis. We observe that efficient washers and low
flow toilets had already been adopted by around 58% and 61% of our sample, respectively;
whereas landscape transformation and weather-based controllers had already been adopted
by only 27.07% and 14.92%, respectively.
Table 6: Rates of water-efficient technology adoption prior to the analysis (% of the sample)
Adoption rates prior to the analysis
Efficient washers 58.42%
Low flow toilets 61.29%
Landscape transformation 27.07%
Weather-based controllers 14.92%
Rogers (2003) states that households adopting a technology after 50% of the population
already has adopted, as is the case for our indoor technology adopters, can be categorized
as Late majority. According to this seminal work, this type of consumer is characterized by
being skeptical about innovation, having little opinion leadership, and being in contact with
other consumers in late majority and early majority. This characterization seems consistent
with our findings that these consumers adopt the subsidized technology but do not experi-
ence an acceleration effect. Regarding the outdoor water-efficient technologies, households
performing landscape transformation and adopting weather-based controllers in our study
can be categorized as early majority and early adopters. These consumers have the highest
degree of opinion leadership among the other adopter categories and therefore are more likely
to adopt other water-efficient technologies. Again, this is consistent with our findings that
households receiving rebates for the adoption of outdoor technologies tend to invest signifi-
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cantly more in other technologies. All of this suggests that rebate programs to promote the
adoption of water-efficient technologies may be more effective when the level of adoption is
still low, such as for our outdoor technologies, instead of promoting more well-established
indoor technologies.
As noted in Section 1, our dataset does not allow us to directly estimate the amount
of water conservation achieved due to the rebate programs because we lack exact adoption
dates. Thus, it is not possible to conduct benefit-cost or cost-effectiveness analyses for the
rebate programs using only this data. In order to address this issue, we combine our results
with the water conservation estimates from the Water Short List by Inskeep and Attari
(2014) to draw policy conclusions. Because we reject for all rebate programs the null hy-
potheses of Total and Partial crowding-out (when considering Tot WT and NoSub WT ),
we can say that the four programs generate additional water savings. According to Inskeep
and Attari (2014), indoor technologies tend to achieve lower water savings compared to out-
door technologies. In particular, Efficient washers and Low flow toilets may reduce indoor
water use by around 17% and 19%, respectively, whereas estimated outdoor water savings
for Landscape transformation and Weather-based controllers are 20-100%6 and 30%, respec-
tively. Considering that average indoor and outdoor water use by Californian households are
roughly the same, it is apparent that outdoor technologies are likely to generate larger water
savings. Moreover, as seen above, rebates for outdoor technologies not only generate a direct
additionality effect, but also an acceleration effect. Therefore, for both of these reasons,
it is seems that outdoor rebate programs have greater potential water savings than indoor
programs. To investigate relative cost-effectiveness for water agencies7, we show in Table
7 the rebate amounts for each of the technologies considered. The amounts are relatively
6Water savings achieved by replacing turf grass with water-wise landscaping differs based on the propor-
tion of lawn replaced.
7 In order to analyze cost-effectiveness for the consumers, one would need to compute the level of water
use saved due to the rebate programs, but also the percentage of the investment covered by the rebate
program. Unfortunately, that information is not available in our data. Participant households receive the
rebate after purchasing the qualifying device in the store they choose. There is a large number of qualifying
devices for each of the technologies considered in this analysis, and therefore, the percentage of the cost
covered varies depending on the device selected by the household and the store where it is purchased.
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similar, with Efficient washers being the highest. Therefore, if households appropriately
use each technology and achieve the estimated savings mentioned above, one could expect
that rebates for outdoor technologies would also be the most cost-effective. However, further
analysis would be needed to investigate these speculative claims.
Table 7: Rebate amount perceived by participant
Rebate amount ($)
Efficient washers $200
Low flow toilets $150
Landscape transformation $1508
Weather-based controllers $150
6 Conclusions
This paper analyzes the effects of several residential rebate programs on the adoption of
indoor and outdoor water-efficient technologies in a Southern California water district. To
do so, we adapt a common approach in the R&D literature that allows us to address two
research questions. First, we test whether each rebate program generates larger investment
in water-efficient technologies that would not have occurred in the absence of the rebate.
Second, we analyze whether each rebate program promotes additional private investments
in the other technologies we observe.
Our results indicate that while rebates for indoor technologies increase adoption to levels
that would not have occurred in the absence of the program, these rebates do not gen-
erate an acceleration effect. In the case of rebates for outdoor technologies, we observe
both effects, although the acceleration effect is limited to additional private investment in
outdoor technologies. That is, the impact of rebates for outdoor technologies seems to be
greater. Furthermore, because the outdoor water-efficient technologies in our analysis are in
early stages of adoption, rebates would be useful to further promote the diffusion of these
technologies into additional households.
8Rebate participants obtain $3 per square foot of turf removed, with $150 being the mean rebate.
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Moreover, while our database does not allow us to estimate the actual level of water
savings caused by the rebate programs, we can use the Water Short List by Inskeep and
Attari (2014) to conclude that rebates for the adoption of outdoor water-efficient technologies
seem to generate larger direct water savings, and also indirect water savings due to the
acceleration effect. Moreover, considering that the rebate amounts are almost identical
across subsidized technologies, one could expect the rebates for outdoor technologies to
be more cost-effective if households use them appropriately. However, additional research
that directly analyzes the cost-effectiveness of rebate programs is needed to substantiate
these claims. In the current context of increasing water scarcity and heightened budget
austerity, such information could help policy makers design rebate programs that generate
larger benefits on limited budgets.
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